Risk aversion and incentive compatibility with ex post information asymmetry
- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung (Laufzeit 1997 - 2008) ; 98-38
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Schlagwort
-
Kredit
Finanzintermediation
Bank
LEN-Modell
Risiko
Allokation
Asymmetrische Information
Theorie
Kredit ; Finanzintermediation ; Bank ; Agency-Theorie ; Risiko ; Allokation ; Asymmetrische Information
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Mannheim
- (wer)
-
Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
- (wann)
-
1998
- Urheber
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-28838
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
25.03.2025, 13:52 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Beteiligte
- Hellwig, Martin
- Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
Entstanden
- 1998
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