- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
In: Games and Economic Behavior ; 69 (2010), 2. - S. 312-328. - ISSN 0899-8256
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Konstanz
- (wer)
-
Bibliothek der Universität Konstanz
- (wann)
-
2011
- Urheber
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-127126
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
25.03.2025, 13:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Beteiligte
- Englmaier, Florian
- Wambach, Achim
- Bibliothek der Universität Konstanz
Entstanden
- 2011
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