Hochschulschrift
The impact of inequity aversion on relational incentive contracts
- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Maße
-
29 cm
- Umfang
-
XI, 98 Bl.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
graph. Darst.
Berlin, Humboldt-Univ., Diss., 2009
- Schlagwort
-
Leistungsmotivation
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Gerechtigkeit
Präferenztheorie
Unvollständiger Vertrag
Leistungsentgelt
Arbeitsgruppe
Neid
Theorie
Leistungsmotivation
LEN-Modell
Gerechtigkeit
Präferenzfunktion
Präferenzordnung
Wahlhandlungstheorie
Kontrakttheorie
Leistungslohn
Arbeitsgruppe
Teamwork
Neid
- Urheber
- Inhaltsverzeichnis
- Rechteinformation
-
Bei diesem Objekt liegt nur das Inhaltsverzeichnis digital vor. Der Zugriff darauf ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
11.06.2025, 13:54 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp
- Hochschulschrift
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