- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
Heidelberg, Univ., Diss., 2003
- Schlagwort
-
Wahl
Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie
Asymmetrische Information
Politiker
Leistungsanreiz
Spieltheorie
Theorie
Politische Entscheidung
Anreiz
Kontrakttheorie
Politiker
Wahl
Spieltheorie
Europawahl
Wahl
Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie
Asymmetrische Information
Politiker
Politikerin
Anreizsystem
Spieltheorie
Politische Entscheidung
Wahl ; Politiker ; Wahlkampf ; Vertrag
- Urheber
-
Liessem, Verena
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-opus-38379
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
25.03.2025, 13:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Hochschulschrift
- Online-Publikation
Beteiligte
- Liessem, Verena
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