- Location
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
-
Online-Ressource
- Language
-
Englisch
- Notes
-
Heidelberg, Univ., Diss., 2003
- Keyword
-
Wahl
Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie
Asymmetrische Information
Politiker
Leistungsanreiz
Spieltheorie
Theorie
Politische Entscheidung
Anreiz
Kontrakttheorie
Politiker
Wahl
Spieltheorie
Europawahl
Wahl
Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie
Asymmetrische Information
Politiker
Politikerin
Anreizsystem
Spieltheorie
Politische Entscheidung
Wahl ; Politiker ; Wahlkampf ; Vertrag
- Creator
-
Liessem, Verena
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-opus-38379
- Rights
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
25.03.2025, 1:43 PM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Hochschulschrift
- Online-Publikation
Associated
- Liessem, Verena
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