Arbeitspapier
Auctioning Incentive Contracts: An Experimental Study
In this note, we experimentally examine the relative performance of price-only auctions and multi-attribute auctions. We do so in procurement settings where the buyer can give the winning bidder incentives to exert effort on non-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically implement the surplus maximizing mechanism. Our experiment confirms this result. Moreover, we observe that the “pie” is shared the same in both auctions between buyer and suppliers both in theory and in the lab (after accounting for learning effects).
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 09-101/1
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Auctions
Economics of Contract: Theory
- Subject
-
Procurement
Price-only auctions
Multi-attribute auctions
Incentive Contracts
Laboratory Experiment
Auktionstheorie
Anreizvertrag
Vertragstheorie
Test
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Onderstal, Sander
de Meerendonk, Arthur Van
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
-
2009
- Handle
- Last update
- 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Onderstal, Sander
- de Meerendonk, Arthur Van
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2009
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