Arbeitspapier

Self-Selection and the Power of Incentive Schemes: An Experimental Study

We examine how self-selection of workers into firms depends on the power of the firms' incentive schemes and how it affects the performance of firms that increase the power of the incentive schemes. In a laboratory experiment, we let subjects choose between (low-powered) team incentives and (high-powered) individual incentives. We observe that subjects exhibiting high trust or reciprocity in the trust game are more likely to choose team incentives. When exposed to individual incentives, workers who chose team incentives perform worse if both the unobservable interdependency between workers and their incentive to cooperate under team incentives are high.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 10-074/1

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Thema
Incentive scheme
Self-selection
Laboratory experiment
Leistungsanreiz
Arbeitsproduktivität
Arbeitsgruppe
Vertrauen
Spieltheorie
Test

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Vyrastekova, Jana
Onderstal, Sander
Koning, Pierre
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Vyrastekova, Jana
  • Onderstal, Sander
  • Koning, Pierre
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2010

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