Arbeitspapier
Self-Selection and the Power of Incentive Schemes: An Experimental Study
We examine how self-selection of workers into firms depends on the power of the firms' incentive schemes and how it affects the performance of firms that increase the power of the incentive schemes. In a laboratory experiment, we let subjects choose between (low-powered) team incentives and (high-powered) individual incentives. We observe that subjects exhibiting high trust or reciprocity in the trust game are more likely to choose team incentives. When exposed to individual incentives, workers who chose team incentives perform worse if both the unobservable interdependency between workers and their incentive to cooperate under team incentives are high.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 10-074/1
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- Subject
-
Incentive scheme
Self-selection
Laboratory experiment
Leistungsanreiz
Arbeitsproduktivität
Arbeitsgruppe
Vertrauen
Spieltheorie
Test
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Vyrastekova, Jana
Onderstal, Sander
Koning, Pierre
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
-
2010
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Vyrastekova, Jana
- Onderstal, Sander
- Koning, Pierre
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2010
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