Arbeitspapier
The curse of knowledge increases self-selection into competition: Experimental evidence
The psychology literature provides ample evidence that people have difficulties taking the perspective of less-informed others. This paper presents a controlled experiment showing that this "curse of knowledge" can cause comparative overconfidence and overentry into competition. In a broader context, the results provide an explanation for the overconfidence of nascent entrepreneurs and the substantial rate of failure among new businesses.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2014-207
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Expectations; Speculations
- Thema
-
curse of knowledge
hindsight bias
information projection
overconfidence
sorting
incentive schemes
competition
beliefs
experiments
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Danz, David
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Danz, David
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Entstanden
- 2014
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