- Location
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
-
Online-Ressource
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
In: The Economic Journal ; 130 (2020), 632. - S. 2468-2496. - Oxford University Press (OUP). - ISSN 0013-0133. - eISSN 1468-0297
- Classification
-
Politik
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (where)
-
Konstanz
- (who)
-
KOPS Universität Konstanz
- (when)
-
2020
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-2-1gk4fnzjp89i04
- Rights
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
25.03.2025, 1:50 PM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Fehrler, Sebastian
- Fischbacher, Urs
- Schneider, Maik T.
- KOPS Universität Konstanz
Time of origin
- 2020
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