Arbeitspapier | Working paper
The curse of knowledge increases self-selection into competition: experimental evidence
The psychology literature provides ample evidence that people have difficulties taking the perspective of less-informed others. This paper presents a controlled experiment showing that this "curse of knowledge" can cause comparative overconfidence and overentry into competition. In a broader context, the results provide an explanation for the overconfidence of nascent entrepreneurs and the substantial rate of failure among new businesses. (author's abstract)
- Umfang
-
Seite(n): 64
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
Status: Veröffentlichungsversion; begutachtet
- Erschienen in
-
Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten (SP II 2014-207)
- Thema
-
Wirtschaft
Psychologie
Soziologie, Anthropologie
Sozialpsychologie
Wissenssoziologie
Volkswirtschaftstheorie
Wissen
Selbstbewusstsein
Wettbewerb
Anreizsystem
Experiment
Information
Unternehmen
Verhalten
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Danz, David
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
- (wo)
-
Deutschland, Berlin
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 21.06.2024, 16:27 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Danz, David
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Entstanden
- 2014
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