Arbeitspapier
Performance and Relative Incentive Pay: The Role of Social Preferences
Under relative performance pay, other-regarding workers internalize the negative externality they impose on other workers. In one form -increased own effort reduces others' payoffs- this results in other-regarding individuals depressing efforts. In another form punishment reduces the payoff of other workers- groups with other-regarding individuals feature higher efforts because it is more difficult for these individuals to sustain low-effort (collusive) outcomes. We explore these effects experimentally and find other-regarding workers tend to depress efforts by 15% on average. However, selfish workers are nearly three times more likely to lead workers to coordinate on minimal efforts when communication is possible. Hence, the social preferences composition of a team of workers has nuanced consequences on efforts.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 13-176/VII
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Personnel Economics: General
Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General
- Thema
-
Social Preferences
Relative Performance
Collusion
Leadership
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hernandez, Pablo
Minor, Dylan B.
Sisak, Dana
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hernandez, Pablo
- Minor, Dylan B.
- Sisak, Dana
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2013
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