Performance and Relative Incentive Pay: The Role of Social Preferences

Arbeitspapier

Under relative performance pay, other-regarding workers internalize the negative externality they impose on other workers. In one form -increased own effort reduces others' payoffs- this results in other-regarding individuals depressing efforts. In another form punishment reduces the payoff of other workers- groups with other-regarding individuals feature higher efforts because it is more difficult for these individuals to sustain low-effort (collusive) outcomes. We explore these effects experimentally and find other-regarding workers tend to depress efforts by 15% on average. However, selfish workers are nearly three times more likely to lead workers to coordinate on minimal efforts when communication is possible. Hence, the social preferences composition of a team of workers has nuanced consequences on efforts.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 13-176/VII

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Personnel Economics: General ; Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General
• Thema: Social Preferences ; Relative Performance ; Collusion ; Leadership

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Hernandez, Pablo ; Minor, Dylan B. ; Sisak, Dana
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Tinbergen Institute
• (wo): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/87395
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ