- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Deutsch
- Erschienen in
-
IZA Discussion Papers ; 5323
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Schlagwort
-
Vertragstheorie
Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit
Noise Trading
Pareto-Optimum
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Kontrakttheorie
Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit
Entscheidungsregel
Noise trading
Pareto-Optimum
LEN-Modell
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wer)
-
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH
- (wann)
-
2010
- Urheber
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-201103223333
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
25.03.2025, 13:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Beteiligte
- Prat, Julien
- Jovanovic, Boyan
- Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH
Entstanden
- 2010
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