Arbeitspapier

Incentive compatibility on the blockchain

A blockchain is a digital ledger that keeps track of a record of ownership without the need for a designated party to update and enforce changes to the record. The updating of the ledger is done directly by the users of the blockchain and is traditionally governed by a proof-of-work (PoW) protocol. We formalize this protocol as a Cournot game where users compete to update the blockchain for a reward. Cheating occurs in the form of "double spending" when users try to tamper with ownership records in order to defraud their counterparties. Ruling out incentives to cheat can be summarized in the form of a "no double-spending constraint." These constraints put restrictions on the design of a blockchain and, thus, play a role akin to incentive compatibility constraints in classic mechanism design.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper ; No. 2018-34

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Other Economic Systems: Public Economics; Financial Economics
Thema
Digital currencies
Payment clearing and settlement systems
Economic models

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Chiu, Jonathan
Koeppl, Thorsten V.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bank of Canada
(wo)
Ottawa
(wann)
2018

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2018-34
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Chiu, Jonathan
  • Koeppl, Thorsten V.
  • Bank of Canada

Entstanden

  • 2018

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