Arbeitspapier

Risk Sharing in the Presence of a Public Good

This paper studies an economy where agents can spend resources on consuming a private good and on funding a public good. There is asymmetric information regarding agents' relative preference for private versus public good consumption. I show how private good consumption should be coordinated across agents within each period to ensure efficient contributions to fund the public good. If agents contributed similar amounts in the past, then coordination takes the form of positively correlated contributions in the current period. If an agent contributed more in the past, then coordination prescribes statecontingent socially wasteful private good consumption in the current period for that agent.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bank of Canada Working Paper ; No. 2015-27

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Fiscal Policy
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Contract: Theory
Thema
Fiscal policy
Financial stability
Financial system regulation and policies

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Schroth, Josef
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bank of Canada
(wo)
Ottawa
(wann)
2015

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2015-27
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Schroth, Josef
  • Bank of Canada

Entstanden

  • 2015

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