Arbeitspapier

Information, Risk Sharing and Incentives in Agency Problems

This paper studies the use of information for incentives and risk sharing in agency problems. When the principal is risk neutral or the outcome is contractible, risk sharing is unnecessary or completely taken care of by a contract on the outcome. In this case, information systems are ranked according to their informativeness of the agent's action. When the outcome is noncontractible, however, the principal has to rely on imperfect information for both incentives and risk sharing. Under the first-order approach, we characterize a problem-independent ranking of information systems, which is relaxed from Gjesdal's (1982) criterion. We also find sufficient conditions justifying the first-order approach.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bank of Canada Working Paper ; No. 2015-7

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Economic models

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Xie, Jia
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bank of Canada
(where)
Ottawa
(when)
2015

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2015-7
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Xie, Jia
  • Bank of Canada

Time of origin

  • 2015

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