Arbeitspapier
Rollover risk, liquidity and macroprudential regulation
I study rollover risk in the wholesale funding market when intermediaries can hold liquidity ex ante and are subject to fire sales ex post. Precautionary liquidity restores multiple equilibria in a global rollover game. An intermediate liquidity level supports both the usual run equilibrium and an efficient equilibrium. I provide a uniqueness refinement to characterize the privately optimal liquidity choice. Because of fire sales, liquidity holdings are strategic substitutes. Intermediaries free ride on the liquidity of other intermediaries, causing excessive liquidation. A macroprudential authority internalizes the systemic nature of liquidity and restores constrained efficiency by imposing a macroprudential liquidity buffer.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Bank of Canada Working Paper ; No. 2014-23
Financial Crises
Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Financial system regulation and policies
- DOI
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doi:10.34989/swp-2014-23
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ahnert, Toni
- Bank of Canada
Entstanden
- 2014