Arbeitspapier

Rollover risk, liquidity and macroprudential regulation

I study rollover risk in the wholesale funding market when intermediaries can hold liquidity ex ante and are subject to fire sales ex post. Precautionary liquidity restores multiple equilibria in a global rollover game. An intermediate liquidity level supports both the usual run equilibrium and an efficient equilibrium. I provide a uniqueness refinement to characterize the privately optimal liquidity choice. Because of fire sales, liquidity holdings are strategic substitutes. Intermediaries free ride on the liquidity of other intermediaries, causing excessive liquidation. A macroprudential authority internalizes the systemic nature of liquidity and restores constrained efficiency by imposing a macroprudential liquidity buffer.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bank of Canada Working Paper ; No. 2014-23

Classification
Wirtschaft
Financial Crises
Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Subject
Financial institutions
Financial system regulation and policies

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ahnert, Toni
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bank of Canada
(where)
Ottawa
(when)
2014

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2014-23
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ahnert, Toni
  • Bank of Canada

Time of origin

  • 2014

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