Arbeitspapier
Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive-Compatibility: An Introduction
This paper is an introduction to the analysis of games with incomplete information, using a Bayesian model. the logical foundations of the Bayesian model are discussed. To describe rational behavior of players in a Bayesian game, two basic solution concerts are present: Bayesian equilibrium, for games in which the players cannot communicate; and Bayesian incentive-compatibility, for games in which the players can communicate. The concept of virtual utility is developed as a tool for characterizing efficient incentive-compatible coordination mechanisms.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 548
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Myerson, Roger B.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (wo)
-
Evanston, IL
- (wann)
-
1983
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Myerson, Roger B.
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Entstanden
- 1983
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