Arbeitspapier
Incentive-Compatibility in Large Games
We argue that large games are of analytical interest partly because they can be understood in terms of a unifying condition of incentive-compatibility, strategyproofness. In contrast to finite games, strategy-proofness applies not only to dominantstrategy equilibria, but also to a large class of Nash equilibria and to Bayesian Nash equilibria with independent types. Based on Kolmogorov''s zero-one law, it is also shown that Bayesian Nash equilibria coincide with a class of Nash equilibria in games of incomplete information when there is a countably infinite number of players and types are independent.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 95-16
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Nehring, Klaus
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of California, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Davis, CA
- (wann)
-
1995
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Nehring, Klaus
- University of California, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 1995
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Incentive compatibility on the blockchain
Incentive Compatibility Ten Years Later
Incentive Compatibility Problems in Soviet-Type Economies
Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive-Compatibility: An Introduction
Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability New Results and Classic Applications
Public-good provision in large economies: Robust incentive compatibility, immunity to robustly blocking coalitions, and voting
Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games
Ambiguity aversion solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
Dynamic mechanism design: Incentive compatibility, profit maximization and information disclosure
Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years On
Economic and Political Equilibria in Optimal Taxation. Is Incentive Compatibility Enough?
A Partial Characterization of Organizations and Environments Which are Consistent With Incentive Compatibility
Incentive compatibility on the blockchain
Incentive Compatibility Ten Years Later
Incentive Compatibility Problems in Soviet-Type Economies
Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive-Compatibility: An Introduction
Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability New Results and Classic Applications
Public-good provision in large economies: Robust incentive compatibility, immunity to robustly blocking coalitions, and voting
Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games
Ambiguity aversion solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
Dynamic mechanism design: Incentive compatibility, profit maximization and information disclosure
Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years On
Economic and Political Equilibria in Optimal Taxation. Is Incentive Compatibility Enough?
A Partial Characterization of Organizations and Environments Which are Consistent With Incentive Compatibility
Incentive compatibility on the blockchain
Incentive Compatibility Ten Years Later
Incentive Compatibility Problems in Soviet-Type Economies
Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive-Compatibility: An Introduction
Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability New Results and Classic Applications
Public-good provision in large economies: Robust incentive compatibility, immunity to robustly blocking coalitions, and voting
Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games
Ambiguity aversion solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
Dynamic mechanism design: Incentive compatibility, profit maximization and information disclosure
Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years On
Economic and Political Equilibria in Optimal Taxation. Is Incentive Compatibility Enough?