Arbeitspapier
Incentive-Compatibility in Large Games
We argue that large games are of analytical interest partly because they can be understood in terms of a unifying condition of incentive-compatibility, strategyproofness. In contrast to finite games, strategy-proofness applies not only to dominantstrategy equilibria, but also to a large class of Nash equilibria and to Bayesian Nash equilibria with independent types. Based on Kolmogorov''s zero-one law, it is also shown that Bayesian Nash equilibria coincide with a class of Nash equilibria in games of incomplete information when there is a countably infinite number of players and types are independent.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 95-16
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Nehring, Klaus
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
University of California, Department of Economics
- (where)
-
Davis, CA
- (when)
-
1995
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Nehring, Klaus
- University of California, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 1995
Other Objects (12)
Incentive compatibility on the blockchain
Incentive Compatibility Ten Years Later
Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive-Compatibility: An Introduction
Incentive Compatibility Problems in Soviet-Type Economies
Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability New Results and Classic Applications
Public-good provision in large economies: Robust incentive compatibility, immunity to robustly blocking coalitions, and voting
Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years On
Dynamic mechanism design: Incentive compatibility, profit maximization and information disclosure
Ambiguity aversion solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games
Economic and Political Equilibria in Optimal Taxation. Is Incentive Compatibility Enough?
A Partial Characterization of Organizations and Environments Which are Consistent With Incentive Compatibility
Incentive compatibility on the blockchain
Incentive Compatibility Ten Years Later
Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive-Compatibility: An Introduction
Incentive Compatibility Problems in Soviet-Type Economies
Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability New Results and Classic Applications
Public-good provision in large economies: Robust incentive compatibility, immunity to robustly blocking coalitions, and voting
Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years On
Dynamic mechanism design: Incentive compatibility, profit maximization and information disclosure
Ambiguity aversion solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games
Economic and Political Equilibria in Optimal Taxation. Is Incentive Compatibility Enough?
A Partial Characterization of Organizations and Environments Which are Consistent With Incentive Compatibility
Incentive compatibility on the blockchain
Incentive Compatibility Ten Years Later
Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive-Compatibility: An Introduction
Incentive Compatibility Problems in Soviet-Type Economies
Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability New Results and Classic Applications
Public-good provision in large economies: Robust incentive compatibility, immunity to robustly blocking coalitions, and voting
Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years On
Dynamic mechanism design: Incentive compatibility, profit maximization and information disclosure
Ambiguity aversion solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games
Economic and Political Equilibria in Optimal Taxation. Is Incentive Compatibility Enough?