- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
In: Games and Economic Behavior, 141, , S. 303-320
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Mannheim
- (wer)
-
Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
- (wann)
-
2023
- Urheber
-
Aradhye, Aditya
Flesch, János
Staudigl, Mathias
Vermeulen, Dries
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-649936
- Rechteinformation
-
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
14.08.2025, 10:46 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Beteiligte
- Aradhye, Aditya
- Flesch, János
- Staudigl, Mathias
- Vermeulen, Dries
- Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
Entstanden
- 2023
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