Arbeitspapier
Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years On
"Implicit Contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment" (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989) remains our most highly cited work. We briefly review the development of this paper and of our subsequent related work, and conclude with reflections on the future of relational contract theory and practice.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 15881
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Theory
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Contract: Theory
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Organization of Production
Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing
- Subject
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relational contracts
informal enforcement
legal enforcement
incentives
private information
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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MacLeod, W. Bentley
Malcomson, James
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
- (where)
-
Bonn
- (when)
-
2023
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- MacLeod, W. Bentley
- Malcomson, James
- Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2023
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Risk aversion and incentive compatibility with ex post information asymmetry
Ambiguity aversion solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
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Involuntary Unemployment and Implicit Contracts
Incentive-Compatibility in Large Games
Incentive compatibility on the blockchain
Incentive Compatibility Ten Years Later
Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games
Incentive Compatibility Problems in Soviet-Type Economies
Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive-Compatibility: An Introduction
Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability New Results and Classic Applications
Risk aversion and incentive compatibility with ex post information asymmetry
Ambiguity aversion solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
Dynamic mechanism design: Incentive compatibility, profit maximization and information disclosure
A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems
Involuntary Unemployment and Implicit Contracts
Incentive-Compatibility in Large Games
Incentive compatibility on the blockchain
Incentive Compatibility Ten Years Later
Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games
Incentive Compatibility Problems in Soviet-Type Economies
Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive-Compatibility: An Introduction
Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability New Results and Classic Applications
Risk aversion and incentive compatibility with ex post information asymmetry
Ambiguity aversion solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
Dynamic mechanism design: Incentive compatibility, profit maximization and information disclosure