Arbeitspapier
Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability New Results and Classic Applications
We provide several generalizations of Mailath's (1987) result that in games of asymmetric information with a continuum of types incentive compatibility plus separation implies differentiability of the informed agent's strategy. The new results extend the theory to classic models in finance such as Leland and Pyle (1977), Glosten (1989), and DeMarzo and Duffie (1999), that were not previously covered.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 447
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling: General
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
- Thema
-
Adverse selection
separation
differentiable strategies
incentive compatibility
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Mailath, George J.
von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (wo)
-
München
- (wann)
-
2013
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.17413
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-17413-4
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Mailath, George J.
- von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Entstanden
- 2013