Arbeitspapier

Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability New Results and Classic Applications

We provide several generalizations of Mailath's (1987) result that in games of asymmetric information with a continuum of types incentive compatibility plus separation implies differentiability of the informed agent's strategy. The new results extend the theory to classic models in finance such as Leland and Pyle (1977), Glosten (1989), and DeMarzo and Duffie (1999), that were not previously covered.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 447

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling: General
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
Thema
Adverse selection
separation
differentiable strategies
incentive compatibility

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Mailath, George J.
von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(wo)
München
(wann)
2013

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.17413
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-17413-4
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Mailath, George J.
  • von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Entstanden

  • 2013

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