Arbeitspapier
A note on Condorcet consistency and the median voter
We discuss to which extent the median voter theorem extends to the domain of single-peaked preferences on median spaces. After observing that on this domain a Condorcet winner need not exist, we show that if a Condorcet winner does exist, then it coincides with the median alternative ('the median voter'). Based on this result, we propose two non-cooperative games that implement the unique strategy-proof social choice rule on this domain.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: KIT Working Paper Series in Economics ; No. 17
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Buechel, Berno
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON)
- (where)
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Karlsruhe
- (when)
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2011
- DOI
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doi:10.5445/IR/1000022559
- Handle
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:swb:90-225599
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Buechel, Berno
- Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON)
Time of origin
- 2011
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