Why are more redistributive social security systems smaller? : A median voter approach

Arbeitspapier

We suggest a political economy explanation for the stylized fact that intragenerationally more redistributive social security systems are smaller. Our key insight is that linking benefits to past earnings (less redistributiveness) reduces the efficiency cost of social security (due to endogenous labor supply). This encourages voters who benefit from social security to support higher contribution rates in political equilibrium. We test our theory with a numerical analysis of eight European countries. Our simple, but suggestive median voter model performs relatively well in explaining the stylized fact and cross-country differences in social security contribution rates.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1397

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Social Security and Public Pensions
• Thema: earnings-related and flat-rate benefits ; social security ; public pensions ; median voter model ; Sozialversicherung ; Soziale Sicherung ; Einkommensumverteilung ; Sozialversicherungsbeitrag ; Umlageverfahren ; Median Voter ; Schätzung ; EU-Staaten

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Koethenbuerger, Marko ; Poutvaara, Panu ; Profeta, Paola
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2005

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18761
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ