Arbeitspapier
Why are more redistributive social security systems smaller? : A median voter approach
We suggest a political economy explanation for the stylized fact that intragenerationally more redistributive social security systems are smaller. Our key insight is that linking benefits to past earnings (less redistributiveness) reduces the efficiency cost of social security (due to endogenous labor supply). This encourages voters who benefit from social security to support higher contribution rates in political equilibrium. We test our theory with a numerical analysis of eight European countries. Our simple, but suggestive median voter model performs relatively well in explaining the stylized fact and cross-country differences in social security contribution rates.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1397
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Social Security and Public Pensions
- Subject
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earnings-related and flat-rate benefits
social security
public pensions
median voter model
Sozialversicherung
Soziale Sicherung
Einkommensumverteilung
Sozialversicherungsbeitrag
Umlageverfahren
Median Voter
Schätzung
EU-Staaten
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Koethenbuerger, Marko
Poutvaara, Panu
Profeta, Paola
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
-
2005
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Koethenbuerger, Marko
- Poutvaara, Panu
- Profeta, Paola
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2005