Arbeitspapier
Employment effects of centralization in wage setting in a median voter model
Most models on centralization in wage setting rest on the assumption of identical firms. This stands in sharp contrast to informal statements against centralization wich rest on the argument that firms are heterogenous and that equal treatment of firms by unions must therefore be ineffcient. We analyse one aspect of this debate in the framework of a median voter model with heterogenous firms but we don't find unique negative employment effects. It may be cumbersome or even impossible to check whether the conditions for unique effects are met. Explorative investigations of the magnitude of the implied effects show however, that they are noteworthy only if differences between firms are large.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IAB-Discussion Paper ; No. 2/2006
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining
- Thema
-
Lohntheorie
Arbeitsmarkttheorie
Lohnfindung
Zentralisierung
Beschäftigungseffekte
Tarifverhandlungen - Effizienz
Gewerkschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ludsteck, Johannes
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB)
- (wo)
-
Nürnberg
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ludsteck, Johannes
- Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB)
Entstanden
- 2006
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