Artikel
Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. The three conditions are stated using the two associated families of monotonic fixed ballots and depend very much on the power each agent has to unilaterally change the outcomes of the two generalized median voter schemes. We perform a specific analysis of all median voter schemes, the anonymous subfamily of generalized median voter schemes.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 11 ; Year: 2016 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 547-586 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- Subject
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Generalized median voting schemes
strategy-proofness
anonymity
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Arribillaga, R. Pablo
Massó, Jordi
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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The Econometric Society
- (where)
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New Haven, CT
- (when)
-
2016
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/TE1910
- Handle
- Last update
- 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Arribillaga, R. Pablo
- Massó, Jordi
- The Econometric Society
Time of origin
- 2016
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