Arbeitspapier
The principle of minimum differentiation revisited: Return of the median voter
We study a linear location model (Hotelling, 1929) in which n (with n ≥ 2) boundedly rational players follow (noisy) myopic best-reply behavior. We show through numerical and mathematical analysis that such players spend almost all the time clustered together near the center, re-establishing the "Principle of Minimum Differentiation" that had been discredited by equilibrium analyses. Thus, our analysis of the best-response dynamics shows that when considering market dynamics as well as their policy and welfare implications, it may be important to look beyond equilibrium analyses.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 792
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location: General
- Thema
-
Hotelling location model
Principle of Minimum Differentiation
Nash equilibrium
Best-response dynamics
Stochastic stability
Invariant measures
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hanaki, Nobuyuki
Tanimura, Emily
Vriend, Nicolaas J.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
- (wo)
-
London
- (wann)
-
2016
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hanaki, Nobuyuki
- Tanimura, Emily
- Vriend, Nicolaas J.
- Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
Entstanden
- 2016
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