Arbeitspapier
Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economies
We consider the problem of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. We study how large a preference domain can be to allow for the existence of strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient allocation rules when the amount of the good is a variable. This question is qualified by an additional requirement that a domain should include a minimally rich domain. We first characterize the uniform rule (Bennasy, 1982) as the unique strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient rule on a minimally rich domain when the amount of the good is fixed. Then, exploiting this characterization, we establish the following: There is a unique maximal domain that includes a minimally rich domain and allows for the existence of strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient rules when the amount of good is a variable. It is the single-plateaued domain.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 628
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Allokation
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Mizobuchi, Hideyuki
Serizawa, Shigehiro
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (where)
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Osaka
- (when)
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2005
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Mizobuchi, Hideyuki
- Serizawa, Shigehiro
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Time of origin
- 2005
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