Arbeitspapier

Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economies

We consider the problem of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. We study how large a preference domain can be to allow for the existence of strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient allocation rules when the amount of the good is a variable. This question is qualified by an additional requirement that a domain should include a minimally rich domain. We first characterize the uniform rule (Bennasy, 1982) as the unique strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient rule on a minimally rich domain when the amount of the good is fixed. Then, exploiting this characterization, we establish the following: There is a unique maximal domain that includes a minimally rich domain and allows for the existence of strategy-proof, symmetric, and efficient rules when the amount of good is a variable. It is the single-plateaued domain.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 628

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Allokation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Mizobuchi, Hideyuki
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
(wo)
Osaka
(wann)
2005

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Mizobuchi, Hideyuki
  • Serizawa, Shigehiro
  • Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Entstanden

  • 2005

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