Arbeitspapier
Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good
We consider the problem of choosing a level of a public good on an interval of the real line among a group of agents. A probabilistic rule chooses a probability distribution over the interval for each preference profile. We investigate strategy-proof probabilistic rules in the case where distributions are compared based on stochastic dominance relations. First, on a minimally rich domain, we characterize the so-called probabilistic generalized median rules (Ehlers et al., 2002, Journal of Economic Theory 105: 408-434) by means of stochastic-dominance (sd) strategy-proofness and ontoness. Next, we study how much we can enlarge a domain to allow for the existence of sd-strategy-proof probabilistic rules that satisfy ontoness and the no-vetoer condition. We establish that the domain of convex preferences is the unique maximal domain including a minimally rich domain for these properties.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 823
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Thema
-
public good
probabilistic rule
stochastic dominance relation
strategy-proofness
minimally rich domain
maximal domain
Öffentliche Güter
Abstimmungsregel
Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung
Neue politische Ökonomie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Morimoto, Shuhei
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (wo)
-
Osaka
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Morimoto, Shuhei
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Entstanden
- 2011