Arbeitspapier

Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good

We consider the problem of choosing a level of a public good on an interval of the real line among a group of agents. A probabilistic rule chooses a probability distribution over the interval for each preference profile. We investigate strategy-proof probabilistic rules in the case where distributions are compared based on stochastic dominance relations. First, on a minimally rich domain, we characterize the so-called probabilistic generalized median rules (Ehlers et al., 2002, Journal of Economic Theory 105: 408-434) by means of stochastic-dominance (sd) strategy-proofness and ontoness. Next, we study how much we can enlarge a domain to allow for the existence of sd-strategy-proof probabilistic rules that satisfy ontoness and the no-vetoer condition. We establish that the domain of convex preferences is the unique maximal domain including a minimally rich domain for these properties.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 823

Classification
Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Subject
public good
probabilistic rule
stochastic dominance relation
strategy-proofness
minimally rich domain
maximal domain
Öffentliche Güter
Abstimmungsregel
Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung
Neue politische Ökonomie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Morimoto, Shuhei
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
(where)
Osaka
(when)
2011

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Morimoto, Shuhei
  • Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Time of origin

  • 2011

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