Arbeitspapier
Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good
We consider the problem of choosing a level of a public good on an interval of the real line among a group of agents. A probabilistic rule chooses a probability distribution over the interval for each preference profile. We investigate strategy-proof probabilistic rules in the case where distributions are compared based on stochastic dominance relations. First, on a minimally rich domain, we characterize the so-called probabilistic generalized median rules (Ehlers et al., 2002, Journal of Economic Theory 105: 408-434) by means of stochastic-dominance (sd) strategy-proofness and ontoness. Next, we study how much we can enlarge a domain to allow for the existence of sd-strategy-proof probabilistic rules that satisfy ontoness and the no-vetoer condition. We establish that the domain of convex preferences is the unique maximal domain including a minimally rich domain for these properties.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 823
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Subject
-
public good
probabilistic rule
stochastic dominance relation
strategy-proofness
minimally rich domain
maximal domain
Öffentliche Güter
Abstimmungsregel
Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung
Neue politische Ökonomie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Morimoto, Shuhei
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (where)
-
Osaka
- (when)
-
2011
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Morimoto, Shuhei
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Time of origin
- 2011