Arbeitspapier
A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model
Following Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, Econometrica 59, 595-609), we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable preferences is a maximal domain for the existence of rules satisfying strategyproofness and no-vetoer.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 809
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Public Goods
- Thema
-
social choice
public decision making
voting by committees
generalized median voter scheme
separable preference
Medianwähler-Modell
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hatsumi, Kantaro
Berga, Dolors
Serizawa, Shigehiro
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (wo)
-
Osaka
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hatsumi, Kantaro
- Berga, Dolors
- Serizawa, Shigehiro
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Entstanden
- 2011
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