Arbeitspapier
Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies of homogeneous indivisible objects
We consider the allotment problems of homogeneous indivisible objects among agents with single-peaked and risk-averse von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility functions. We establish that the rule satisfies coalitional strategy-proofness, same-sideness, and strong symmetry if and only if it is the uniform probabilistic rule. By constructing an example, we show that if same-sideness is replaced by respect for unanimity, the statement does not hold even with additional requirements of peaks-onlyness and continuity.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 686
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- Thema
-
coalitional strategy-proofness
homogeneous indivisible objects
single-peakedness
risk-averseness
uniform probabilistic rule
Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion
Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit
Erwartungsnutzen
Risikoaversion
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hatsumi, Kentaro
Serizawa, Shigehiro
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (wo)
-
Osaka
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hatsumi, Kentaro
- Serizawa, Shigehiro
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Entstanden
- 2007
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