Arbeitspapier
Second-best incentive compatible allocation rules for multiple-type indivisible objects
We consider the problem of allocating several types of indivisible goods when preferences are separable and monetary transfers are not allowed. Our finding is that the coordinatewise application of strategy-proof and non-wasteful rules yields a strategy-proof rule with the following efficiency property: no strategy-proof rule Pareto-dominates the rule. Such rules are abundant as they include the coordinate-wise use of the two well-known priority-based rules of the top trading cycles (TTC) and the deferred acceptance (DA). Moreover, our result supports the current practice in Market Design that separately treats each type of market for its design.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2014-201
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Market Design
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Thema
-
strategy-proofness
second-best incentive compatibility
top trading cycles rules
deferred acceptance rules
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Anno, Hidekazu
Kurino, Morimitsu
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Anno, Hidekazu
- Kurino, Morimitsu
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Entstanden
- 2014
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