Incentive compatible reimbursement schemes for physicians

Arbeitspapier

We consider physicians with fixed capacity levels. If a physician's capacity exceeds demand, she may have an incentive to overtreat, i.e., she may provide unnecessary treatments to use up idle capacity. By contrast, with excess demand she may undertreat, i.e., she may not provide necessary treatments since other activities are financially more attractive. We first show that simple fee-for-service reimbursement schemes do not provide proper incentives. If insurers use, however, fee-for-service schemes with quantity restrictions, they solve the fraudulent physician problem.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Discussion Papers ; No. 10-01

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Analysis of Health Care Markets
• Subject: credence goods ; expert services ; incentives ; medical doctors ; demand inducement ; insurance ; Gesundheitsversorgung ; Ärzte ; Nachfrage ; Ökonomischer Anreiz ; Krankenversicherung ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Emons, Winand
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Bern, Department of Economics
• (where): Bern
• (when): 2010

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76763
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET