Arbeitspapier
Incentive-compatible elicitation of quantiles
Incorporation of expert information in inference or decision settings is often important, especially in cases where data are unavailable, costly or unreliable. One approach is to elicit prior quantiles from an expert and then to fit these to a statistical distribution and proceed according to Bayes rule. An incentive-compatible elicitation method using an external randomization is available.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CAE Working Paper ; No. 09-13
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Bayesian inference
mechanism design
prior assessment
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Kiefer, Nicholas M.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Cornell University, Center for Analytical Economics (CAE)
- (where)
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Ithaca, NY
- (when)
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2009
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Kiefer, Nicholas M.
- Cornell University, Center for Analytical Economics (CAE)
Time of origin
- 2009
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