Arbeitspapier
A Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism for fair division
We consider the problem of fairly allocating one indivisible object when monetary transfers are possible, and examine the existence of Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms to solve the problem. We propose a mechanism that satisfies envy-freeness, budget balancedness, and Bayesian incentive compatibility. Further, we establish the uniqueness of the mechanism under an order additivity condition. This result contrasts well with various results on the incompatibility between efficiency and ex post incentive compatibility.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 721
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Thema
-
Bayesian incentive compatibility
Fair division
Indivisible good
Mechanism design
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Fujinaka, Yuji
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (wo)
-
Osaka
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Fujinaka, Yuji
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Entstanden
- 2008
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Ex-Post Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design
A Group Incentive Compatible Mechanism Yielding Core Allocation
Incentive compatible cost allocation schemes
Incentive compatible cost allocation schemes
Collectively incentive compatible tax systems
Incentive-compatible elicitation of quantiles
Incentive compatible regression learning : (extended abstract)
Debt Relief and Incentive-Compatible Conditionality
Incentive compatible reimbursement schemes for physicians
Incentive Compatible Control of Decentralized Organizations
Bankruptcy Remoteness and Incentive-compatible Securitization
Dynamic, incentive-compatible contracting for health services
Ex-Post Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design
A Group Incentive Compatible Mechanism Yielding Core Allocation
Incentive compatible cost allocation schemes
Incentive compatible cost allocation schemes
Collectively incentive compatible tax systems
Incentive-compatible elicitation of quantiles
Incentive compatible regression learning : (extended abstract)
Debt Relief and Incentive-Compatible Conditionality
Incentive compatible reimbursement schemes for physicians
Incentive Compatible Control of Decentralized Organizations
Bankruptcy Remoteness and Incentive-compatible Securitization
Dynamic, incentive-compatible contracting for health services
Ex-Post Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design
A Group Incentive Compatible Mechanism Yielding Core Allocation
Incentive compatible cost allocation schemes
Incentive compatible cost allocation schemes
Collectively incentive compatible tax systems
Incentive-compatible elicitation of quantiles
Incentive compatible regression learning : (extended abstract)
Debt Relief and Incentive-Compatible Conditionality
Incentive compatible reimbursement schemes for physicians
Incentive Compatible Control of Decentralized Organizations
Bankruptcy Remoteness and Incentive-compatible Securitization