A Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism for fair division

Arbeitspapier

We consider the problem of fairly allocating one indivisible object when monetary transfers are possible, and examine the existence of Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms to solve the problem. We propose a mechanism that satisfies envy-freeness, budget balancedness, and Bayesian incentive compatibility. Further, we establish the uniqueness of the mechanism under an order additivity condition. This result contrasts well with various results on the incompatibility between efficiency and ex post incentive compatibility.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 721

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
• Subject: Bayesian incentive compatibility ; Fair division ; Indivisible good ; Mechanism design

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Fujinaka, Yuji
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
• (where): Osaka
• (when): 2008

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92628
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET