Collectively incentive compatible tax systems

Arbeitspapier

This paper assumes that individuals possess private information both about their abilities and about their valuation of a public good. Individuals can undertake collective actions on order to manipulate the tax system and the decision on public good provision. Consequently, an implementable scheme of taxation has to be collectively incentive compatible. If preferences are additively separable, then an implementable tax systems has the following properties: (i) tax payments do not depend on public goods preferences and (ii) there is no scope for a collective manipulation of public goods preferences. For a quasilinear economy, the optimal tax system is explicitly characterized.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2006,24

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; Public Goods
• Subject: Optimal Taxation ; Public Good Provision ; Revelation of Preferences ; Information Aggregation

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bierbrauer, Felix
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2006

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26908
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET