Arbeitspapier
Ex Post Efficiency and Individual Rationality in Incentive Compatible Trading Mechanisms
This paper concerns the design of a trading mechanism for a group of traders when their valuations of the good are private information and they bargain over who shall consume more than his initial endowment and who shall consume less. It is shown that there generally exists a set of initial endowments of the traded commodity such that it is possible to design a trading mechanism which is incentive compatible, individually rational and ex post efficient.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: IUI Working Paper ; No. 202
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Development Planning and Policy: Trade Policy; Factor Movement; Foreign Exchange Policy
- Subject
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Efficient trading
mechanism design.
Verhandlungen
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Lundgren, Stefan
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
- (where)
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Stockholm
- (when)
-
1988
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Lundgren, Stefan
- The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
Time of origin
- 1988
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