Arbeitspapier
Dynamic, incentive-compatible contracting for health services
This paper aims to characterise a dynamic, incentive-compatible contract for the provision of health services, allowing for both moral hazard and adverse selection. Patients' severity changes over time following a stochastic process and is private information of the provider. We characterise the optimal dynamic contract and show that it is made up of two components: a timeinvariant payment, which depends on the structural characteristics of the provider, and a timevarying component, which is affected by both patient and hospital characteristics. To illustrate the characteristics of the dynamic contract and compare it with a more standard static contract, we provide a numerical exercise calibrated with data from hip replacement hospitalisations in Italy.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 016.2023
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Publicly Provided Private Goods
Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
hospital payments
dynamic mechanism design
DRG
two-part tariffs
adverse selection
moral hazard
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Levaggi, Rosella
Moretto, Michele
Pertile, Paolo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2023
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Levaggi, Rosella
- Moretto, Michele
- Pertile, Paolo
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2023
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