Arbeitspapier
Incentive compatible reimbursement schemes for physicians
We consider physicians with fixed capacity levels. If a physician's capacity exceeds demand, she may have an incentive to overtreat, i.e., she may provide unnecessary treatments to use up idle capacity. By contrast, with excess demand she may undertreat, i.e., she may not provide necessary treatments since other activities are financially more attractive. We first show that simple fee-for-service reimbursement schemes do not provide proper incentives. If insurers use, however, fee-for-service schemes with quantity restrictions, they solve the fraudulent physician problem.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Papers ; No. 10-01
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Analysis of Health Care Markets
- Thema
-
credence goods
expert services
incentives
medical doctors
demand inducement
insurance
Gesundheitsversorgung
Ärzte
Nachfrage
Ökonomischer Anreiz
Krankenversicherung
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Emons, Winand
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Bern, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Bern
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Emons, Winand
- University of Bern, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2010
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