Arbeitspapier
Strategy-Proof Allocation of Objects Revisited
We consider an allocation problem with a finite number of objects, and agents that demand at most one of the objects. The study provides a characterization of a class of strategy-proof price mechanisms. A mechanism belongs to the class if and only if the price space is restricted in a special way and, given that restriction, the outcome prices are minimal. The domain of the mechanisms is the set of general preference profiles (R_1,R_2,…,R_n), i.e., where R_a is agent a's rational, monotonic and continuous preference ordering over objects and prices.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2018:21
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Auctions
Market Design
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
Characterization
House-allocation
Strategy-proofness
Multiobject auction
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Andersson, Tommy
Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Lund
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Andersson, Tommy
- Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
- Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2018
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