Arbeitspapier
Strategy-proofness and Fixed-price Allocation of Indivisible Goods - a Characterization Proof
In this paper we considered the classical Shapley-Scarf (1974) "house allocation model", where in addition there is a perfectly divisible good (money). The problem is to characterize all strategy-proof, nonbossy and individually rational allocation mechanisms. The finding is that only a fixed-price allocation mechanism is consistent with these presumptions. Miyagawa (2001) first proved this result. Here we give an alternative and comparatively short proof of the characterization result.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 2002:17
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- Subject
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Strategy-proof
Indivisible object
Housing market
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
- (where)
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Lund
- (when)
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2002
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
- Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2002
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