Arbeitspapier
Strategy-proofness and Fixed-price Allocation of Indivisible Goods - a Characterization Proof
In this paper we considered the classical Shapley-Scarf (1974) "house allocation model", where in addition there is a perfectly divisible good (money). The problem is to characterize all strategy-proof, nonbossy and individually rational allocation mechanisms. The finding is that only a fixed-price allocation mechanism is consistent with these presumptions. Miyagawa (2001) first proved this result. Here we give an alternative and comparatively short proof of the characterization result.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 2002:17
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- Thema
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Strategy-proof
Indivisible object
Housing market
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Lund
- (wann)
-
2002
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
- Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2002
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