Artikel
Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods
In this paper, we show that in pure exchange economies where the number of goods equals or exceeds the number of agents, any Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanism always allocates the total endowment to some single agent even if the receivers vary.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 12 ; Year: 2017 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1267-1306 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Subject
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Social choice
strategy-proofness
Pareto efficiency
exchange economy
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Momi, Takeshi
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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The Econometric Society
- (where)
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New Haven, CT
- (when)
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2017
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/TE1792
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Momi, Takeshi
- The Econometric Society
Time of origin
- 2017
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