Arbeitspapier

Good governance and good aid allocation

We model the aid allocation decision where the donor government has announced that good governance is the criterion for receiving aid. Potential recipients must compete for the aid funds. The structure of the competition is important to the donor in terms of achieving good governance, and to the recipients in terms of what they receive. The leaders of potential recipient countries look at aid availability through this contest as part of the competing objectives they face - some good, some not good. The donor country prefers a contest under which the aid will only go to one country while the leaders of the receiving countries prefer that each country obtains the proportion of aid relative to its governance quality. If poverty reduction is an independent goal as well, a poverty trap may be created. With good governance as a criterion, donors may work through both bilateral and multilateral agencies.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 3585

Classification
Wirtschaft
Economic Development: General
Subject
Foreign aid
governance
decentralization
rent seeking
Entwicklungshilfe
Entwicklungshilfekonditionen
Good Governance
Wettbewerb
Rent Seeking
Entwicklungskooperation
Dezentralisierung
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Epstein, Gil S.
Gang, Ira N.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2008

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-20080711104
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Epstein, Gil S.
  • Gang, Ira N.
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2008

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