Arbeitspapier
Contests, NGOs and decentralizing aid
International donors usually have particular goals they want to achieve with their foreign aid, for example, poverty alleviation. In the international aid story lobbying by potential recipient groups attempting to capture the donor's support play a potentially important role for nongovernmental organizations. We model this situation as a hierarchical contest and compare the implications of a centralized allocation process with a decentralized allocation process with nongovernmental organizations as intermediaries.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 1711
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Foreign Aid
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Thema
-
contests
NGOs
aid
Entwicklungshilfe
Nichtregierungsorganisation
Allokation
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Epstein, Gil S.
Gang, Ira N.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2005
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Epstein, Gil S.
- Gang, Ira N.
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2005
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