Decentralizing aid with interested parties

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyzes the decentralization of decision-making in aid-giving in a theoretical rent-seeking framework. In this analysis the root donor establishes a necessary criterion for potential recipients: good governance. The potential recipients compete in hierarchal contests for funds. The paper investigates whether, under certain reasonable conditions, fashionable aid procedures will lead to the development of a poverty trap.

Show object

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2006-29

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Economic Development: General ; International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations ; Foreign Aid ; Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development ; Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Panel Data Models; Spatio-temporal Models ; Empirical Studies of Economic Growth; Aggregate Productivity; Cross-Country Output Convergence ; Macroeconomics: Consumption; Saving; Wealth ; Investment; Capital; Intangible Capital; Capacity
• Subject: Foreign aid ; rent seeking ; governance ; decentralization

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Epstein, Gil S. ; Gang, Ira N.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Rutgers University, Department of Economics
• (where): New Brunswick, NJ
• (when): 2006

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31263