The political economy of Kosher Wars

Arbeitspapier

In this paper we develop a theory of “Kosher Wars” under which Rabbis (certifying authorities) compete to enhance the level of Jewish observation of their congregations. The level of observance can be seen as the Rabbi’s rents. Our rent-seeking model explains the establishment of Kashrut standards, first with European style community control under a single Rabbi, and then under America’s voluntary structure with the possibility of competing Rabbis.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2002-27

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Cultural Economics: Religion
• Subject: dietary restrictions ; Kashrut ; kosher ; religion ; rent-seeking ; Rent Seeking ; Judentum ; Theorie ; Europa ; USA ; Ernährungsverhalten

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Epstein, Gil S. ; Gang, Ira N.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Rutgers University, Department of Economics
• (where): New Brunswick, NJ
• (when): 2002

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79187
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET